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Futures Markets and the 
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Monetary Growth, and 
Asset  Returns* 
I.  Introduction  and Outline  of the Analysis 
The U.S. dollar  is extremely  useful as a means  of 
payment  and a unit of account. This convenience 
motivates people to use the dollar as a basis for 
spot agreements as well as for long-term con- 
tracts. But if inflation  is uncertain,  then there are 
risks associated with the specification  of obliga- 
tions in terms of dollars.  These risks, which have 
been substantial  in recent years, affect the equi- 
librium  interest rates on financial  assets and the 
required  expected returns  from physical invest- 
ments. In particular, to the extent that people 
lack information  about future price levels, they 
will find it risky to undertake  long-term  projects. 
Hence, uncertainty about inflation tends to re- 
tard investment and to distort the allocation of 
resources across sectors of the economy. 
Futures contracts in price indices would al- 
leviate some of the adverse consequences from 
inflation. First, the existence  of  these  futures 
markets would provide a convenient means for 
people to hedge the risks from inflation.  In par- 
ticular, an investor in a long-term  project would 
not also have to be a speculator  on inflation.  Sec- 
ond, the price quotes on these markets  would be 
a useful source of information,  which would al- 
low people to calculate accurately  the real value 
of their dollar-denominated  contracts. 
* I am grateful  for helpful comments  from Sandy Gross- 
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Inflation  and nominal 
interest  rates have 
been volatile in recent 
years. Futures  con- 
tracts in price indices 
would help in this envi- 
ronment  by enhancing 
information  about 
prices and by providing 
a convenient means for 
people to hedge against 
inflation.  There is some 
evidence that the avail- 
ability of these instru- 
ments would encourage 
investment  and reduce 
the mean real rate of 
return  on long-term 
bonds. Indexed 
bonds-which  are now 
significant  in Britain- 
serve a similar  pur- 
pose. In the absence of 
such bonds, there 
would be a market  for 
price-index  futures, al- 
though  the volume of 
trading  would probably 
be modest. S22  Journal of Business 
This study analyzes the role of price-index  futures  in an environment 
of volatile inflation  and interest rates. Section II discusses the predict- 
ability  of inflation  in the U.S. economy. Notably, there  is evidence that 
inflation  uncertainty  is substantial  and has increased since the early 
1970s. Section III relates the uncertainty  of inflation  to the observed 
volatility  in nominal  interest rates. One conclusion  is that the volatility 
in interest  rates has dramatically  increased  the risk  from  holding  dollar- 
denominated  long-term  bonds. This extra risk explains the substantial 
recent interest in long-term  interest rates relative to short-term  rates. 
Section IV analyzes how the introduction of price-index futures 
would affect equilibrium  real interest rates. There is also a discussion 
of the beneficial  effects of this futures market  on investment. Finally, 
by looking at the net position of various sectors in nominally de- 
nominated  assets and liabilities,  there is some indication  of the sources 
of  hedging demand for consumer price index (CPI) futures. Non- 
financial  businesses, insurance  companies, pension funds, and house- 
holds are potential participants,  whereas a variety of financial  institu- 
tions would seem to be more interested in interest-rate  futures. 
Section V points out that futures  contracts  on price indices are anal- 
ogous to index bonds. Thus it is useful to study the recent experience 
of the United Kingdom  with indexed  financial  instruments.  That  exper- 
iment shows a significant  level of demand, especially from pension 
funds. However, there is a limited volume of trading  in these assets. 
Sections VI and VII document some of the adverse effects from 
uncertain  inflation  and from the underlying  behavior  of monetary  pol- 
icy. Specifically, the unpredictability  of aggregate  money and prices 
tends to go along with greater  dispersion  of actual and expected infla- 
tion across markets.  This dispersion  leads in turn  to adverse effects on 
such macroeconomic variables as output, employment, and invest- 
ment. The results suggest that the implementation  of a futures  market 
in price indices (or a market  in indexed bonds) would have beneficial 
effects on these macro variables. 
Finally, Section VIII considers some general criticisms of futures 
markets. There is no evidence that these markets  divert capital from 
productive enterprises; rather, the indication is that futures markets 
foster information  flows and thereby improve the allocation of re- 
sources. Similarly,  the positive association  between price  volatility  and 
the volume of futures trading reflects reverse causation. More price 
volatility motivates an increase in the extent of futures  trading,  which 
then has some moderating  influence  on price volatility. 
II.  The Predictability of Inflation 
When  people enter into contracts  that fix obligations  in nominal  terms, 
a change  in the price level alters  the real  value of these obligations.  For Futures Markets and Fluctuations  S23 
example,  the real value of a nominally  denominated  bond is affected  by 
inflation.  To the extent that inflation  is predictable,  the fixing of con- 
tracts in terms of dollars has no major  economic consequences. Each 
party  to the agreement  would base his or her decision on the known 
real  costs or benefits. In the case of bonds, people would know ex ante 
the real rate of interest-that  is,  the nominal rate less  the rate of 
inflation-which then affects decisions to save and invest. However, 
to the extent that inflation  is unpredictable,  the real  value of obligations 
will be uncertain. In order to see how important  this element is,  I 
examine  first the degree to which U.S. inflation  has been predictable. 
Fama and others' have measured  the information  that interest rates 
and other variables contain about future inflation.  Table 1 shows the 
general  nature of these types of results for regression  equations with 
annual data from the post-World War II period. For 1953-71, the 
interest  rate (on government  issues with 1-year  maturity)  has roughly  a 
one-to-one relation  to subsequent  inflation  (based on the CPI without 
the shelter component). The coefficient of the interest rate in row 1 of 
the table is  .82 (SE  =  .15). Adding lagged values of inflation and 
monetary growth (MI) in row 2  eliminates the  interest rate as  a 
significant  variable  (contrary  to Fama).  This finding  indicates  that  there 
are systematic variations  over time in expected real interest  rates. The 
standard-error-of-estimate  in row 2 is  &r  =  0.9%, which suggests a 
relatively  low forecast error  for 1-year-ahead  inflation. 
After 1971 the interest rate is not useful as a predictor  of inflation 
(rows 5 and 6 of the table). Also, even with the lags of inflation  and 
monetary  growth included, the error variance for inflation  is greater 
than before (a' =  .015, versus the earlier value of  .009). Thus two 
points emerge  from these results. First, in recent years market  interest 
rates are not helpful for predicting  inflation,  and, second, using other 
variables  such as lagged inflation  and monetary  growth, the prediction 
error  for inflation  is substantially  higher than it used to be. Thus, be- 
cause of the substantial  uncertainty  about  inflation,  market  participants 
would have serious problems in evaluating the real implications of 
nominally  denominated  contracts, including  dollar  bonds. 
The Livingston survey on inflationary  expectations provides some 
related information. This semiannual survey, begun in  1946, asks 
roughly  fifty economists (fewer in the early years of the sample)  about 
their projected value of the CPI 6 or 12 months hence. Presumably, 
these forecasts consider the variables, such as nominal  interest rates, 
that appear  in table 1. The implied  forecasts of inflation  for each year, 
denoted Tr',  are shown along with actual inflation  for 1948-84 in table 
2. (The value 'rr comes from the two 6-month-ahead  forecasts for year 
t.) For 1953-71, the mean value of expected inflation  is 0.9%  per year, 
1. Fama 1975;  Schwert  and Nelson 1977;  and Fama  and Gibbons  1982. S24  Journal of Business 
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TABLE 2  Inflation Rates and Expected Inflation from 
the Livingston Survey (% per year) 
Year  -rT,  la t  t 
1948  .8  1.2  -.4 
1949  -3.0  -4.0  1.0 
1950  8.2  -.2  8.4 
1951  4.1  3.1  1.0 
1952  .2  1.1  -  .9 
1953  .7  -.6  1.3 
1954  -1.2  -.9  -.3 
1955  .0  .3  -.3 
1956  3.3  .5  2.8 
1957  3.4  1.3  2.1 
1958  1.3  .1  1.2 
1959  1.1  .6  .5 
1960  1.6  .7  .9 
1961  .7  .6  .1 
1962  1.4  1.0  .4 
1963  1.5  1.0  .5 
1964  1.0  1.0  .0 
1965  2.0  1.1  .9 
1966  3.0  1.7  1.3 
1967  3.5  2.1  1.4 
1968  4.0  2.8  1.2 
1969  5.3  2.9  2.4 
1970  4.4  3.6  .8 
1971  3.3  3.8  -.5 
1972  3.6  3.3  .3 
1973  9.5  3.6  5.9 
1974  11.2  6.2  5.0 
1975  6.5  6.7  -.2 
1976  5.2  5.6  -.4 
1977  6.0  5.6  .4 
1978  8.2  6.2  2.0 
1979  11.3  7.6  3.7 
1980  10.3  10.4  -  .1 
1981  7.7  9.7  -  2.0 
1982  4.1  6.1  -2.0 
1983  4.0  4.5  -  .5 
1984  3.1  5.3  -  2.2 
NOTE.-The  inflation  rate, -rr,  refers  to the change  in the CPI  from 
January  of each year  to January  of the next year. I use the figures  that 
exclude the shelter component  in order to avoid some problems  of 
measuring  mortgage  interest  costs. The variable 4e,  from  the Living- 
ston Survey,  comes from  the Federal  Reserve  Bank  of Philadelphia.  I 
use an average  for each year  of the 6-month  forecasts  (from  December 
of the previous  year and June of the current  year). S26  Journal of Business 
while the mean of the standard deviation of the survey responses 
across the participants  is 0.6%. For 1973-85, the mean of expected 
inflation  is 6.1%  with a mean standard  deviation  of 1.7%.  The tripling  in 
the average standard  deviation-from  0.6% to 1.7%-indicates  that 
greater  differences  of opinion about future  inflation  have accompanied 
the increased forecasting variance for inflation  (as well as the rise in 
mean inflation).  Although  this association is not inevitable, it is to be 
expected that greater  overall volatility  of inflation  would go along with 
a greater  diversity of opinion. Thus the Livingston data reinforce  the 
conclusion that problems with forecasting  future prices have become 
much more serious in recent years. 
III.  Inflation Risk and Asset Returns 
The recent volatility of inflation  has been associated with a great in- 
crease in the volatility of nominal interest rates. Table 3 (based on 
Ibbotson and Sinquefield [1985]) shows the standard deviations of 
monthly  returns  on various assets from 1926  to 1984.  In each case, the 
standard  deviation (expressed on an annual basis) is relative to the 
asset's average  return  for the year. For example, on long-term  govern- 
ment bonds the standard  deviation for nominal  returns  in 1981  was a 
remarkable  21 percentage points per year, as compared  with a mean 
nominal return  during  that year from holding bonds of about 2% per 
year. By contrast, the standard  deviation was typically below 5 per- 
centage  points per year until  the late 1960s  and did not get much  above 
10 percentage  points until 1980. Even for Treasury  bills, which people 
often think of as nearly risk free, the standard  deviation for monthly 
returns  in 1980 was nearly 1 percentage  point per year, as compared 
with a typical value of about  0.1 percentage  point  before  the late 1960s. 
When looking at weekly returns  on Treasury  bills in the recent period, 
Cornell  (1983b,  p. 650) finds a particularly  dramatic  effect. From  Janu- 
ary 1978  to October 1979,  the standard  deviation  of the weekly returns 
was about 10 basis points. But from October 1979  to December 1981 
this figure  rose to about 40 basis points. 
The increased  volatility of nominal  interest  rates can have an impor- 
tant effect on the required average real rate of return on nominally 
denominated  assets. Note first  that an increase  in the short-term  rate  of 
interest  tends to lower the price of long-term  bonds. Thereby,  the yield 
on long-term  bonds remains  competitive with the new higher  yield on 
short bonds. Further, these effects are particularly  strong if the in- 
crease in current  short-term  interest  rates signals  that  future  short-term 
rates are also likely to be higher.  This connection  arises if either  higher 
inflation  or higher  real interest rates tend to persist over time. Then a 
surprise  increase in short-term  interest rates-due  either to higher  ex- 
pected inflation or to higher real rates-tends  to go along with low 
(perhaps  negative) realized returns  on holdings  of long-term  bonds. Futures Markets and Fluctuations  S27 
The effect on the risk premium  on bonds depends on whether in- 
creases in nominal interest rates-for  example, those due to unex- 
pected inflation-tend to go along with good or bad economic times. If 
with good times, then bonds do badly in good times and vice versa, 
which is a desirable property  that is consistent with a low mean real 
rate  of return  on bonds. But if unexpected  increases  in nominal  interest 
rates correlate with bad times, then bonds would require a risk pre- 
mium.  Further,  given this last pattern  of correlation,  a greater  volatility 
of interest rates means a larger  risk premium. 
The standard  view until the early 1970s was that high unexpected 
inflation  went along with an economic boom. This association  arises in 
some "Phillips Curve" theories, in which monetary expansions (or 
some other shocks to aggregate  demand)  raise both output  and prices. 
But "supply shocks,"  such as the recent oil crises, tend to lower 
output  while raising  the price level. Further,  as discussed by Friedman 
(1977)  and documented  statistically  by Fair (1979, table 3), this type of 
shock has been dominant in the last decade. Hence, in the present 
environment,  the real return  on dollar-denominated  assets tends to be 
good in good times (when inflation  is low and output  is high)  and bad in 
bad times. This pattern means that these assets now require a risk 
premium. 
Bodie,  Kane, and McDonald (1983) have tested part of this hy- 
pothesis by observing the covariance between returns  on bonds and 
returns  on stocks. They show that the recent rise in yields on long-term 
bonds can be attributed  to the volatility  of their  real returns.  Until 1977 
they estimate the premium  of long-term  bonds over short-term  bonds 
to be near zero. But the recent volatility of interest rates has made 
long-term  bonds so risky  that  the required  excess return  rose to about  4 
percentage  points per year in 1980-82. 
It should be possible to estimate the risk premium  on bonds by 
observing  the covariance of the real returns  with a direct measure of 
well-being, such as the growth of consumption per person. So far I 
have  been  unsuccessful  in  pinning down  this  covariance, using 
monthly  or quarterly  date since 1977. It may be that the monthly  data 
are insufficiently  accurate  and that there are not enough quarterly  ob- 
servations (since 1977)  to get precise estimates. 
IV.  Consequences from the Introduction of CPI Futures 
The previous discussion indicates that a holder  of a nominal  bond will 
require  an inflation  risk  premium  if his or her welfare  is low in the same 
states of nature  that inflation  is surprisingly  high. If this person's wel- 
fare is low when there is high inflation  only because he or she is a net 
holder  of nominal  assets, then the existence of CPI futures  will permit 
this person to eliminate  the effect of inflation  on his or her well-being. 
To the extent that a person can perfectly insulate  well-being  (i.e., real S28  Journal of Business 
TABLE 3  Standard Deviations of Returns on Various Assets 
Long-  Long-  Inflation 
Term  Term  U.S.  Consumer  Adjusted 
Common  Corporate  Government  Treasury  Price  U.S.  Treasury 
Year  Stocks  Bonds  Bonds  Bills  Index  Bills 
1926  11.74  .90  1.76  .31  2.05  2.06 
1927  13.22  1.39  2.66  .11  2.83  2.79 
1928  17.35  1.82  3.21  .59  1.73  1.78 
1929  31.02  2.35  6.52  .20  1.62  1.56 
1930  26.26  2.21  2.25  .29  2.15  2.27 
1931  43.94  6.00  5.49  .16  1.48  1.98 
1932  68.02  7.00  10.31  .29  1.93  1.69 
1933  56.07  10.65  5.11  .10  4.21  3.84 
1934  22.22  2.75  4.12  .04  1.99  2.38 
1935  16.33  2.32  2.76  .01  2.12  1.63 
1936  14.40  1.11  2.10  .02  1.54  1.64 
1937  23.36  1.94  5.02  .05  1.69  2.24 
1938  41.19  2.26  2.23  .07  1.83  1.36 
1939  29.51  5.16  8.11  .02  2.27  2.23 
1940  26.70  1.96  4.92  .02  1.08  1.03 
1941  14.30  1.63  3.67  .03  2.11  1.98 
1942  14.71  .71  1.38  .03  1.28  1.33 
1943  15.62  .88  .64  .01  2.29  2.32 
1944  7.86  1.28  .36  .01  .95  .89 
1945  13.13  1.37  2.70  .01  1.29  1.29 
1946  18.70  2.12  2.74  .00  5.70  5.69 
1947  9.59  2.18  2.93  .07  3.09  2.98 
1948  19.94  2.12  1.90  .07  2.83  2.62 
1949  10.19  2.10  1.72  .02  1.66  1.67 
1950  10.79  1.05  1.45  .03  1.72  1.73 
1951  12.23  4.02  3.14  .05  1.70  1.26 
1952  11.32  2.76  3.20  .07  1.14  1.18 
1953  9.35  5.35  4.99  .10  1.00  .90 
1954  12.95  2.24  3.25  .06  .74  .71 
1955  12.41  2.16  3.64  .13  .67  .74 
1956  14.76  3.20  4.50  .10  1.05  .94 
1957  12.62  8.66  7.71  .07  .65  .71 
1958  6.27  4.65  6.64  .26  .88  .83 
1959  8.00  3.94  3.31  .17  .64  .67 
1960  13.42  3.63  5.72  .26  .70  .71 
1961  8.92  3.47  3.51  .07  .51  .51 
1962  20.09  2.12  3.48  .08  .66  .68 
1963  9.81  1.23  .71  .08  .54  .55 
1964  4.02  1.40  .88  .06  .40  .39 
1965  8.54  1.96  1.50  .08  .65  .66 
1966  10.89  4.79  7.78  .11  .69  .75 
1967  12.11  7.65  7.16  .15  .43  .39 
1968  13.02  7.20  7.92  .09  .40  .45 
1969  12.98  7.46  10.36  .20  .59  .63 
1970  20.29  9.61  13.42  .21  .42  .49 
1971  13.67  10.04  9.47  .18  .55  .60 
1972  6.63  3.01  5.55  .16  .40  .38 
1973  13.87  7.46  8.19  .34  1.42  1.35 
1974  23.93  11.68  8.28  .34  .82  .94 Futures Markets and Fluctuations  S29 
TABLE 3  (Continued) 
Long-  Long-  Inflation 
Term  Term  U.S.  Consumer  Adjusted 
Common  Corporate  Government  Treasury  Price  U.S.  Treasury 
Year  Stocks  Bonds  Bonds  Bills  Index  Bills 
1975  17.89  10.07  8.38  .20  .73  .82 
1976  13.72  4.44  4.71  .13  .46  .39 
1977  9.55  4.50  5.54  .18  .73  .88 
1978  16.64  4.45  4.46  .33  .61  .80 
1979  12.80  10.31  10.43  .25  .45  .59 
1980  17.53  19.91  20.42  .85  1.25  1.16 
1981  12.34  19.85  21.21  .4.3  1.02  .92 
1982  18.32  11.94  10.07  .68  1.52  1.28 
1983  9.50  10.69  10.85  .17  .68  .62 
1984  13.42  12.35  11.05  .29  .57  .56 
SOURCE.-Ibbotson  and Sinquefield  1985,  p. 52. 
consumption)  from inflation, he or she will no longer require a risk 
premium on  nominal bonds in  order to  hold them. That is,  the 
covariance between real consumption  changes and the real return  on 
bonds (short or  long term) can be  reduced to  zero because this 
covariance  depends only on the covariance  between inflation  and con- 
sumption  changes. The latter will be zero when the person uses CPI 
futures to insulate completely his or her consumption changes from 
inflation  risk. If this person is the marginal  person holding, say, Trea- 
sury bills, then it follows that the real yield on bills will fall because of 
the introduction  of CPI futures. Even stronger  effects can operate on 
long-term  interest rates. However, it is unclear at this point whether 
the "marginal  person"  -in  the sense of the person relevant  for deter- 
mination of  interest rates-is  net long or  short on  nominally de- 
nominated  assets. 
As indicated  before, a person will be hurt  by inflation  if he or she is a 
net holder  of nominal  assets-that  is, if the assets with payoffs fixed in 
dollars exceed the liabilities. Note that for every person with a net 
credit  position there is someone with a net debt position (at least if we 
include  foreigners  and the government  in the calculations).  Thus there 
will always be balancing  gains and losses from unanticipated  inflation. 
However, when people engage in nominally denominated  contracts, 
the randomness  of future  inflation  creates risk  because no one knows in 
advance whether inflation  will be higher  or lower than anticipated  and 
thus whether he or she will end up realizing  gains or losses. This risk 
has adverse effects on the economic activities, especially long-term 
investments, in which people are willing to engage. Since CPI futures 
would eliminate  the risks of inflation,  they would also spur  the types of 
economic activities that otherwise entail these risks. For example, 
Milton  and Rose Friedman  (1984, p. 104)  argue  that "futures markets S30  Journal of Business 
in price indexes seem to us the single private-market  development  that 
will do the most to reduce the harm  from uncertain  and unstable  infla- 
tion.  They  will  provide a  mechanism that will  enable long-range 
projects to be undertaken despite the uncertainty of inflation, that 
will  enable  ordinary people  to  protect their assets  despite  that 
uncertainty." 
In order to see how important  this type of effect is likely to be, I 
made a rough estimate of the extent to which various broad  groups  of 
the population were holders of  net nominal assets or net nominal 
liabilities.  The results appear  in table 4, which is based on the Federal 
Reserve's Flow-of-Funds  Accounts for December 1981.  At the highest 
level of aggregation,  the households and life insurance/pension  funds 
were net holders of nominal  assets to the extent of $1.84 trillion. The 
nominal  debtors were the federal government  ($710  billion), state and 
local governments  ($120  billion), and nonfinancial  business ($1.02 tril- 
lion). Various financial  intermediaries  had a nearly balanced  position 
with respect to nominal  assets and liabilities.  In this category  are com- 
mercial banks, savings and loan associations, mutual saving banks, 
credit  unions, finance  companies, and money-market  funds. However, 
these institutions  tend to be imbalanced  with respect to the term struc- 
ture of nominal  interest rates since their assets are typically long-term 
relative to their liabilities. 
Table 4 misses some nominal assets and liabilities in the form of 
wage agreements  and other  promised  payments  for materials.  Also, the 
level of aggregation  is too high to pick out individual  firms or house- 
holds whose positions differ from the aggregate  of their sectors. For 
TABLE 4  Net Position of Various Sectors for 
Nominally Fixed Assets and Liabilities 
Creditor: 
Households  930 
Insurance companies  and pension  funds*  910 
Financial intermediaries  (commercial 
banks,  S&Ls,  mutual savings  banks, 
credit unions,  finance companies, 
money-market  funds)  ot 
Debtor: 
U.S.  government  710 
State and local government  120 
Nonfinancial  business  1,020 
SOURCE.-Data  are constructed  from Board of Governors,  Fed- 
eral  Reserve System (1981),  table  48, Flow-of-Funds  Accounts. 
NOTE.-Amounts  in $ billion  on December  31, 1981. 
* I do not count insurance  and pension reserves as nominal 
liabilities  for the companies  or as nominal  assets for households. 
Otherwise,  the net nominal  assets of the insurance  companies  and 
pension  funds  ($910  billion)  would  be counted  as another  net nom- 
inal asset of the households. 
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example, some researchers argue that unexpected inflation  differen- 
tially affects old and young persons (see Michael 1979). But table 4 
does suggest where some broad groups  of the population  would fall in 
terms of their desires to hedge against uncertain movements in the 
price level. Notably, insurance companies, pension funds, and some 
members  of the household sector would be most eager for protection 
against  unexpectedly high prices. Governments  and nonfinancial  busi- 
nesses tend to be on the opposite side. On the other hand, financial 
intermediaries  would be  concerned mostly with insurance against 
shifts in interest  rates-especially  against  increases in long-term  rates. 
Therefore,  they would be interested  more in interest-rate  futures  than 
in CPI futures. However, interest-rate  futures would not work for the 
groups that are imbalanced between nominal assets and liabilities. 
These groups desire protection against unexpected changes in price 
levels. Interest-rate  futures do not serve this purpose because (sur- 
prise) shifts in nominal interest rates (which reflect revisions to ex- 
pected inflation  and to ex ante real interest rates) are not closely cor- 
related with unexpected inflation. 
V.  Consumer Price Index Futures and Indexed Bonds 
Given the lack of real-world  experience with futures contracts based 
on the CPI or other price indices, theoretical arguments  about the 
potential demand for these instruments  cannot be very convincing. 
However, futures markets  in price indices are essentially equivalent  to 
indexed bonds. These bonds-which  adjust the payments of nominal 
interest  and  principal  in accordance  with realized  changes  in a specified 
price index-provide  for a contractual  real rate of interest. Thus, by 
holding an indexed bond, a person accomplishes the equivalent of a 
nominal  bond plus the appropriate  hedge position in a price-index  fu- 
ture. It follows that the observed demand  for indexed  bonds  reveals the 
potential demand  for futures contracts in price indices. 
Recent experience with indexed bonds falls into three categories:2 
first, countries such as France (1952-58) and Finland (1945-67) that 
issued index-linked debt in conjunction with programs  of economic 
stabilization after World War II; second, countries such as Brazil, 
Argentina,  and Israel that exhibit persistently  high inflation;  and third, 
the recent experiment  in the United Kingdom. For purposes of com- 
parison with the present-day United States, it seems clear that the 
experience in the United Kingdom  would be the most informative. 
The British  government  began  in 1975  to issue nontradable  "national 
savings contracts" that were linked in nominal terms to an index of 
retail prices. Then, following the success of these issues, the govern- 
2.  For further discussion,  see  Page and Trollope (1974). S32  Journal of Business 
ment began in  March 1981 to  issue  marketable, long-term bonds 
("gilts"). These assets linked the nominal  interest  payments  and prin- 
cipal  to a broad  index of retail  prices.3  Until March 1982,  purchases  of 
index-linked  gilts were restricted  to pension funds. Subsequently,  they 
have been available to all, although  pension funds are still the major 
holders. 
The initial  issue of index-linked  bonds in March  1981  provided  a real 
yield of about 2%.4  After averaging  2.8%  in 1982  and 2.9%  in 1983,  the 
real yield on bonds with maturities  of about 25 years rose to 3.4% in 
1984. For January-May 1985 the average yield was 3.5%. For bonds 
with a 5-year maturity, the real yield in early 1985 was about 4.5%. 
This shape for the term structure  indicates  that the market  expects real 
rates to fall in the future. The pattern  of increase in real interest rates 
from 1981  to 1985  corresponds  roughly  to that in the United States-in 
fact, given an international  capital market, the observed real interest 
rates on index-linked  bonds in the United Kingtom tell us something 
about the implicit  expected real yields on long-term  U.S. government 
bonds.5  That is, the British  data on real interest  rates may enable  us to 
infer expected rates of inflation  in the United States. 
As for quantities, the amount of index-linked gilts issued in the 
United Kingdom  from March 1981  through  June 1985  was ?9.0 billion 
in market  value, which is 22%  of the public sector borrowing  require- 
ment  over that  period. In terms of the total stock of marketable  govern- 
ment bonds outstanding,  the index-linked  gilts accounted  for about  8% 
in June 1985. Interestingly, the main infusion of index-linked  bonds 
occurred  during  a period of declining  inflation  rates (the rate of change 
of consumer prices was about 5% for 1983-84, as compared to an 
average rate of 10%  for 1980-82). 
In terms of market acceptance, the indexed bonds now occupy a 
significant  position in the British  financial  picture. However, there has 
been little trading activity in these instruments. It is reasonable to 
conjecture  that a similar  degree  of market  interest  would  greet  the issue 
of indexed bonds by the U.S.  government. In the absence of such 
issues, a private market in price-index futures would meet a similar 
purpose. Therefore,  they would have some market  interest  but proba- 
bly not a great deal of trading  volume. 
3. Because  the index  linking  involves a lag  of 8 months,  the real  yield  on these bonds  is 
not entirely  certain  in advance. The indexed  gilts have a tax advantage  over the nonin- 
dexed ones because the indexation  is free of income tax, whereas  the inflation  compo- 
nent  of the nominal  rate is subject  to tax. (All gilts are free of capital-gains  tax if held  for 
more  than 1 year.) However, the differences  with respect  to income  tax do not apply  to 
pension  funds-the  major  holders  of gilts-because  they are free of income tax. 
4. The information  in this section comes from  Rutherford  (1983),  from  data  provided 
by Charles  Goodhart  and Geoffrey Wood, and from Buckmaster  & Moore  (1985). 
5.  But, since the U.S. bonds are not indexed, they differ  in risk characteristics  from 
the indexed British bonds. There are also differences in tax treatment  between the 
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VI.  Consumer Price Index Futures and Real Effects from the 
Volatility of Inflation and Interest Rates 
A number  of researchers have documented  the adverse economic ef- 
fects from volatility of interest rates and inflation.  Evans (1984)  shows 
that a higher  volatility of interest rates is associated with a lower level 
of output. Specifically,  he estimates the regression  equation  for annual 
data from 1947-81 (with standard  errors in parentheses): 
log(real GNP),  =  ...  +  .43 log(real GNP),1  +  1.01 DMR, 
(.10)  (.20) 
+  .74 DMRt -1  +  .044 log(Gt)  -  .021 VRt. 
(.23)  (.012)  (.005) 
This equation indicates the expansionary  effect of current  and lagged 
monetary shocks (called DMR) and of real federal purchases (G). It 
also shows a negative effect from a higher  value of a measure  of inter- 
est rate volatility, VR. In particular,  this last influence  plays a major 
role in the recent recession-output  is estimated  to be 2%-3%  below 
trend on average from 1980  to 1983  because of this factor. 
Cukierman  (1983) and Marquez  and Vining (1983) surveyed the ex- 
isting evidence about macroeconomic effects on the dispersions of 
relative prices and of beliefs about inflation.  There is strong evidence 
from the United States and other countries that a greater  volatility of 
overall inflation is associated with a higher variance of changes in 
relative prices. For example, this connection is verified  for the United 
States by Vining and Elwertowski  (1976)  and Parks  (1978),  for Canada 
by Chambers  and Dunn (1977), for Germany  by Fischer (1981a), and 
for a cross section of countries by Glejser (1965). However, there is 
little evidence that the observed relationships  derive  from  variability  of 
money (Hercowitz 1982)  and some suggestion that supply shocks are 
crucial (Fischer 1981b).  Cukierman  and Wachtel (1979)-by  using the 
Livingston survey for the  United States-demonstrated  that (as I 
noted before) a greater  variability  of overall inflation  tends also to be 
accompanied  by a greater  variance of expectations about inflation. 
Other researchers  find that a greater  dispersion  of relative prices is 
associated with a lower level of real economic activity. For example, 
Blejer and Leiderman  (1980)  estimate the regression  equations  for the 
United States from 1949  to 1975  (with standard  errors  in parentheses): 
log(yt)  =  ...  -  14.9Vt,  Ut=  ...  +  4.9Vt. 
(4.1)  (1.5) 
Here, y is real GNP, U is the unemployment  rate, and V is a measure  of 
relative  price dispersion. (I have omitted some other variables,  such as 
monetary shocks, that were also included in the regressions.) Thus 
Blejer and Leiderman conclude that a higher value of relative price S34  Journal of Business 
dispersion, Vt, means lower output, yt, and a higher unemployment 
rate, Ut. 
Similarly,  Levi and Makin  (1980)  estimate the equation  (1948-75 for 
the United States): 
dNt  =  ...  -  .63(rt, 
(.22) 
where  dNt is the growth  rate of employment,  and at is the dispersion  of 
inflationary  expectations from the Livingston survey. Thus a greater 
variance  of beliefs about  inflation, at, is associated  with a lower growth 
rate of employment. 
Because of the beneficial  effects on the flow of information,  a futures 
market  in price indices (or a market  in indexed bonds) would tend to 
lower the dispersion of relative prices, Vt, and, especially, to reduce 
the dispersion  of inflationary  expectations, ot. Hence, the findings  re- 
ported  above suggest that this improvement  in information  flow would 
also tend to raise the levels of output, investment, and employment. 
Some direct evidence on the effects of futures markets  on informa- 
tion flows comes from the study by Huberman  and Schwert (1985), 
who consider the market  for indexed bonds in Israel. The existence of 
an indexed bond market allows the aggregation  of information  about 
inflation  in much the same manner  as would a futures market  in price 
indices. In particular,  if prices perfectly aggregate  the information  pos- 
sessed by the participants  in various  local markets,  then, when a price 
index such as the CPI is announced, the price of an indexed bond 
should not change. This result follows because the CPI announcement 
contains  information  about inflation  over the previous  month-but,  by 
hypothesis, trading  during  the previous month  already  led the indexed 
bond price to aggregate  perfectly the information  about inflation  from 
each local market  during  that period. Thus the movement in indexed 
bond prices on the day the CPI is announced  is a measure  of the extent 
to which the market prices over the previous days did not perfectly 
aggregate  information.  Huberman  and Schwert found that there was 
only a small  effect on the prices of indexed  bonds on the announcement 
date. Thus, with the existence of the indexed bond market, people 
obtained  information  rapidly  about the overall price level. This result 
suggests that the existence of a market  for price-index  futures in the 
United States would have similar  beneficial  effects on the flow of price 
information. 
VII.  Money and Interest Rates 
A number  of researchers  (e.g., Cornell 1983a, 1983b;  Roley and Walsh 
1983)  suggest  that the shift in the behavior  of monetary  policy in the fall 
of 1979-supposedly to pay more attention  to monetary  aggregates  and 
less to interest rates-may  partially explain the higher volatility of Futures Markets and Fluctuations  S35 
TABLE 5  Estimated Response (in Basis Points) to a 1% Surprise in Money 
Yield on:  September  1977-October  1979  October  1979-82 
3-month Treasury bills  6.5  36.4 
(3.1)  (6.0) 
1-year bonds  5.2  35.5 
(1.8)  (4.7) 
5-year bonds  2.6  21.2 
(.9)  (3.3) 
20-year bonds  1.2  14.4 
(.7)  (2.8) 
SOURCE.-Based  on Roley  and Walsh (1983, table  1). 
NOTE.-Standard  errors  of coefficients  appear  in parentheses. 
interest rates in recent  years.  The data show  that, in the period from 
late 1979 until late 1982, nominal yields on bonds responded strongly to 
the Federal Reserve's  announcement  that MI was  higher than antici- 
pated. Here the anticipations on MI are the values recorded in a survey 
of financial market participants by Money  Market Services,  Inc.  The 
nature of the evidence  shows  up in table 5. For weekly  data from the 
period October  1979-October  1982, the estimate  is that a 1% surprise 
increase in MI (currently about $5 billion, which would be a large but 
not unprecedented  movement)  raised yields on 3-month Treasury bills 
by about 36 basis points. The effect is positive  on yields for bonds of all 
maturities but declines  to about 14 basis points on 20-year government 
bonds.  On  the  other  hand,  for  the  earlier  period  September  1977- 
October  1979-before  the change  in the Federal Reserve's  operating 
procedures-the  effects  were  much  smaller,  amounting  to  6  basis 
points for 3-month Treasury bills and 1 basis point for 20-year bonds. 
In some  recent  research  on  the  weekly  data from fall  1979 to fall 
1982, I find that,  in addition  to  the  effect  from MI  announcements, 
yields  on  Treasury  bills  and 20-year  government  bonds  respond  in- 
versely  to  the  movements  in the  monetary  base  from the previous  2 
weeks.  Thus there is apparently a short-lived  "liquidity effect"  from 
changes in high-powered money.  These results may be consistent  with 
the transactions-based  monetary theory in Grossman and Weiss (1983) 
and Rotemberg  (1984). Further, in the more recent  data for  1983, the 
effect  of money  announcements  on interest rates has weakened.  This 
observation  may be associated  with another shift of monetary policy, 
this time away from the targeting of monetary aggregates. In any event, 
this behavior  goes  along with  a reduction  in the volatility  of interest 
rates for  1983-84. 
VIII.  Criticisms of Futures Markets 
One common  objection  to futures and options  markets-which  might 
apply as a particular case  to price-index  futures-is  that these  activi- 
ties draw capital away from "productive  enterprises."  (Similar attacks S36  Journal of Business 
have been made against corporate mergers.) Of course, there is no 
direct effect of futures/options  trading on the aggregate  of available 
credit. That is, these markets do not involve a net position, long or 
short, in assets. Rather,  there would have to be indirect  effects on the 
allocation  of resources across sectors, or on the overall desire to save, 
or on the aggregate  demand  for investment, and so on. 
To the extent that organized  futures trading  provides a convenient 
vehicle for hedging  or sharpens  the available  price signals, there would 
be beneficial  real effects on economic activity. The possibility  to lay off 
risks-notably,  those from inflation-would  spur investment  demand. 
Also, there would be a general channeling  of activity toward  the most 
productive  areas rather  than toward  those that happened  to entail low 
inflation  risk or that had rapid  payoffs, and so on. Corresponding  to the 
economic gains, there would be some real resources used up in the 
process of organizing  futures markets  and in the time spent by traders. 
But through  the usual functioning  of the private  economy, the amounts 
of these efforts would be related to the social product  of the activity. 
That is, economically inefficient ("excessive") trading  activity tends 
not to have survival  value.6  If anything,  the tendency is for organizers 
of markets to be unable to capture the full social returns  from their 
activities. For example, as stressed by Grossman  (1977), people can 
free ride on the valuable  price information  that is generated  by futures 
markets.  Hence the number  of organized  markets-and  specifically  the 
varieties of futures contracts available-tends  to be fewer than is so- 
cially optimal. 
Another frequent criticism is that futures markets  have themselves 
led to volatility  in the prices of the underlying  goods or, more recently, 
of interest rates, stock prices, and so on. However, in a direct test for 
six commodities, Cox (1976)  finds evidence that the introduction  of a 
futures market  lowers the variability  of spot prices. Telser and Higin- 
botham (1977), Telser (1981), and Carlton  (1984) do note the positive 
association between price uncertainty  and the overall volume of fu- 
tures trading.7  But the causation is in the opposite direction-that  is, 
an increase in price volatility, as in the period since the mid-1970s, 
leads to an expansion in the number of futures markets and in the 
amount  of trading.  Similarly,  the relatively  tranquil  period  of the 1950s 
and 1960s  saw a decrease in activity on futures  markets.  Futures  trad- 
ing should get substantial  credit neither  for this time of tranquility  nor 
for the price volatility of recent years. 
6. The presence of speculators  who may like gambling  does not alter the argument. 
First, the utility  gained  from  gambling  is as good as any other  type of utility.  Second, as 
discussed  in Telser (1981,  pp. 9 ff.), the existence of these speculators  tends to lower  the 
average  price paid by others. 
7. Carlton  shows also that  government  regulation  has an important  independent  effect 
on the number  of futures  markets  and on trading  volume. Futures Markets and Fluctuations  S37 
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